Finding India in the Indo-Pacific

The shift in terminology from Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific became an important transition as it brought the Indian subcontinent into the Asian narrative. Close to two decades since Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ‘confluence of the two seas’ speech, how does India engage with the countries of the Indo-Pacific? Has there been any evolution in India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific? The Indo-Pacific strategies of the US, EU and Japan refer to engaging with India, but what does India seek in its engagement with the Indo-Pacific countries? 
 

Perennially cautious of the ‘West’, India has been prudent in its rendezvous with the European Union and the United States of America.  While being a member of the QUAD, the term ‘alliance’ has often been used to explain the minilateral grouping. However, statements by US officials such as Kurt Campbell distinguish between the AUKUS (Australia, UK and the US) as an alliance whereas the QUAD or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is referred to as an Indo-Pacific partnership. In this distinction is the understanding that while India is an important country that the Trans-Atlantic powers cannot choose to ignore and are willing to engage, there is a difference in how security threats are understood by the Alliance members vis-à-vis the Indian state. 
 

While trade and defence deals with many in the G7 have increased, India has ensured that it engages with other states in the Indo-Pacific on reciprocal terms. Most recently, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met with Sun Haiyan, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC), who was on a visit to India from 12-14 January 2026. This has been parallel to the China Communist Party team meeting BJP leaders as well as an RSS delegation during its visit to India. These meetings come after thaw in India-China ties in 2024 and the meetings between the foreign ministers of the two states, with resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and the reinstatement of direct flights between the two countries. 
 

India’s engagement in South East Asia, specifically the ASEAN states has been at the collective and individual state level. Keeping ASEAN centrality as its focus, India’s bilateral engagement with Singapore or Vietnam has been one of continuous understanding on the requirements of the states involved. The recent visit by PM Wong of Singapore in September 2025 focused on, among other things, joint collaboration in the space sector, a strategically important area for India. It also focussed on defence and security cooperation at all levels.
 

India is often touted as a state that refuses to commit to a group and engages with all while pledging to none. It has been more willing to participate in groupings such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), be a Net Security Provider to smaller states in the Indian Ocean and engage with different countries that are part of the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific becoming a category has assisted India’s relations with the Indo-Pacific states, deepened multiple groupings in the region and given India space to be a part of the Asian narrative. The change in terminology from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific, thus, provides impetus for India to be more involved in the affairs that may have a direct impact on India and its neighbourhood.